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Do you know what a parable is? When you’re over 50 you don’t tell jokes. You tell
parables. Bear with me a moment for a parable.
The shadows were lengthening in the swamp and the bunny rabbit came hopping down the
trail and the blind snake came hopping down the trail. And the blind bunny rabbit
smacked into the blind snake and they recoiled, and the blind bunny said, “Who and what
are you?” and the snake said, “I don’t know. Who and what are you?” And so they
decided to find out. And slowly that snake wrapped himself around that bunny rabbit and
he said, “You’ve got large ears to hear with and a bunny rabbit tail and rabbit whiskers and
big hoppers. I think you’re a bunny rabbit.” And the blind bunny rabbit said, “Oh what
joy! This is the greatest day of my life! I know what I am! Now, let’s find out what you
are.” And very slowly that snake uncoiled and lay down on the dust of the trail and the
bunny hopped over and reached out: “Cold skin, small beady eyes, speak with a forked
tongue, no visible sex organs…I think you’re a lawyer!”
In the ten years that I have been working on decision making you’re never quite certain
what the outcome of what you start is going to be. And the law of unintended
consequences is very much alive and well, particularly in developing new applications for
decision support. Today I am going to provide a quick overview of the SEAWAY decision
support system.
In San Luis Obispo we have seventy-seven SEAWAY systems which are being prepared
for fielding, and we are deep into the design of the follow on version. So, we are
discussing a decision support system which is operational. Before we explore SEAWAY,
we probably ought to talk about defining decision making problems and applying decision
support.
In the case where the senior decision maker has poor decision skills, even the best decision
support will make only the most marginal of difference. However, good decision support
can make a huge difference if you have just an adequate decision process and adequate
decision-making skills at the top. But without adequate decision-making skills supported
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by an adequate decision process, all the decision support in the world won’t make much
difference.
My second observation on the design of decision support systems is that we have to be
careful not ask the computer to do something which it doesn’t do well. Not because it’s
unfair to the computer, that’s nonsense – but because it will undercut our own mission and
deceive us.
Computers don’t conceptualize. Point one. They don’t have intuition. Point two. And,
three, they do not do well in analyzing subtlety on the modern battlefield in
terms…especially in terms of urban operations and political considerations. With this in
mind, we need to be careful when we talk about decision makers not forget to use this very
elaborate massively parallel processor we’ve got up here on the top of our neck to assess
the subtlety of the battlefield and the campaign.
Now, when conducting seminars at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, I
compare the battlefield that existed prior to Afghanistan with the battlefield that exists
today. Consider just a few of the contrasts with which we are now faced – but which are
not reflected in our decision support tools most of which were developed in the Cold War
period. The gross battlefield of the north German plain, large forces, no ROE, very, very
large movements, few or no rules. A battlefield where precision was not critically
important, and one that rewarded mass, depth, and size. The characteristics of this cold
war framework defined United States military decision support initiatives and, to a very
large extent, continue to do so today. However, we have a problem; this defining
battlefield has disappeared to be replaced by one which is quite different.
Although the “E” word is not fashionable, we are closer to dealing with a situation as a
military which is more akin to the British situation between 1814 and 1914 than we are to
any other period I can think of. So if that’s the case, if we’re dealing with subtle
battlefields with political and military mixtures in places like Afghanistan and Iraq and
elsewhere, then we also need to remember that the individual decision-making skills from
private to general are probably as important as decision support and deserve at least as
much attention.
Second point: Military decision support systems are designed for experienced
professionals – not amateurs. Decision support systems are not designed to raise the
incompetent and inexperienced to an adequate level. The systems are designed to be
leveraged by experienced professionals who understand both the limitations and the
strengths which the computer offers. The poorly trained and the inexperienced will
substitute slavish dependence for calculated evaluation of results.
Third point: There’s a moral dimension to the relationship between a decision support tool
and the decision maker. Depending on where you come from, you will agree or violently
disagree with my next couple of comments. However, in my view, we must never place the
computer between the decision maker and the responsibility to make a decision –
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especially one involving a decision on life and death. Never. When we do that what have
we done? There is no longer a linkage between the person and the action he or she has
directed. There’s no linkage between the decision to take violent action and the
consequences. If the computer is between me and that decision, then all I did was exercise
the computer. At any rate, I think what I have expressed is largely a Marine Corp point of
view, but it’s one that I believe is well worth thinking about.
For the last three years I’ve been working with about thirty Navy and Marine officers
designing and building SEAWAY, a decision support tool for the MAGTF, the Joint Task
Force, and for expeditionary warfare in general.
SEAWAY’s design combines human strengths with computer strengths in a collaborative
framework. On the human side the system design assumes that conceptualization will
come from the user. It is in the design of the system architecturally. Secondly, the design
assumes that the generation of a conceptual scheme of maneuver and its description will
come from a human because this sort of conceptualization is a uniquely human skill. The
design assumes that the computer will provide the ability to track hundreds of thousands of
items. It assumes that the computer will stand back-to -back watches without getting tired,
and that the computer will rapidly convert our conceptual schemes of what the force is
going to do into the logistics and the delivery of “how” it’s going to do it. So,
architecturally, the design “leads to strength.” When you build a decision support tool
“you must “lead to strength” and combine the human strengths with those from the
computer. Don’t ask the computer to do what it can’t do (such as conceptualize) any more
than ask us to track thousands of items individually.
SEAWAY provides tools to support the Joint Task Force and MAGTF at the operational
level of war. Why the Joint Task Force and why the operational level? Because we have
turned “TPFDDing” into a cottage industry. Because we have spent the last 15 years
building strategic tools which we’ve rarely used. Because we have focused on the strategic
level of war rather than the operational because it is easier to deal with. Because we have
done very little to help the force where war is actually waged -- at the operational level.
Because there are no tools for the Joint Task Force commander. Because he has no
capability to analyze theater logistic posture and compare it to the support needed for his
intended campaign. Because he has no capability to translate his intentions into what it
may take to support them. None of the tools needed to support these functions exist. And,
even as we discuss the absence of these needed tools we are standing up permanent joint
task force headquarters. Amazing, isn’t it? Well, that’s why we built SEAWAY.
With these thoughts in mind, I went to ONR about three years ago with a vision and said,
“Look, we’re talking about supporting widely dispersed operations at deep inland locations
whether the focus is Army deep maneuver or Marine operational maneuver form the sea,
or similar joint concepts. We’re proposing inserting forces and supporting them at great
distances inland in joint and coalition operations. That means that the forces will be
supported at the end of a helicopter-borne umbilical. That means that as fast change occurs
(and the only certainty on the battlefield is continual change) we’re going to be forced to
recalculate the support requirement. Think about Iraq. Think about the first Marine
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division’s march to Baghdad. Think about how often unanticipated even by the wildest of
planners that constantly changing operational requirement had to be altered.
As I said, the only certainty on a battlefield is change. You can be certain everything’s
going to change and that the plan is going to be great until the first shot is fired and not a
second farther. After that it’s a new plan. So, the underlying assumption in we built into
SEAWAY is that everything will change all the time. This new decision support tool
would be built to provide recommendations in the face of continuous change.
So, we can establish several characteristics, which SEAWAY had to have. First, lead to
strengths, human and computer. Second, provide assistance in a familiar fashion (Don’t
give staffs a tool that has a whole new face on it). Third, provide flexible tools. Why?
Because we don’t know what the force is going be faced with. We don’t know the kind of
campaigns. Nobody would have predicted Afghanistan or Iraq in 1998. They might have
predicted other things, but those two wouldn’t have been at the top of the list. So tools
which can adapt to any situation… because we can’t predict what the operating forces will
face. Fourth, compliment the established planning process. Provide tools which
compliment what our forces already understand and exercise. Fifth, make the tools
collaborative. In December 2001 five staffs employed SEAWAY at separate locations
simultaneously for three days. All at the same system at the same time from four or five
different locations. Sixth, make it fast and accurate. Identifying change isn’t the battlefield
objective – the objective is spotting its implications and exploiting it before the other guy
can. Finally, seventh, make it useful. Not only do the JTF’s not have any tools, but many
of the tools we’ve given them are either so difficult to use or so trivial that they don’t use
them. Decision support should deal with very difficult issues in complex decision
situations in a fashion familiar to the user.
Constant change. I mentioned that the underlying assumption in SEAWAY’s design was
dealing with continuous battlefield and theater change. What sort of change? The
resources available to the Joint Force Commander change continuously as consumption
and re-supply exercise their opposite effects. The battlefield itself continuously changes,
whether it’s a battlefield like Iraq, or whether it’s something far less well-defined such as
Afghanistan, or a combination of both. The friendly, enemy, and neutral elements are all
dynamic. As a result of these factors and others, plans must change all the time. As a
result, the JTF commander is faced with three continuously changing cycles all of which
interact. SEAWAY is designed to deal with these continuously changing cycles, to accept
constant changes, and to provide alerts, warnings, recommendations, and plans – and to
change these as change demands.
What tools does a JFC have to deal with change? Damn few. While I was a Chief of Staff
in the Pacific, we formed five real JTFs -- and each time it was a pick-up ballgame. Each
time we contributed the tools we thought could help but they were pretty poor. So,
SEAWAY was and is a product of frustration as well as a product of commitment and
need. It must support single service, joint, and coalition operations equally and easily. As
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I think you’ll see during the demonstration, it can do so. And it should do so rapidly
—whether generating options or assessing their supportability.
The tools in SEAWAY were also designed to assist professionals in identifying
opportunity costs and assessing risks. The important word there is “help” – not do it for
them. I’m probably telling some in this audience how to suck eggs, but I find that there’s a
widespread misunderstanding as to the difference between “opportunity cost” and “risk”.
It really is important to understand the distinction. Opportunity cost is an action foregone
as a result of your decision to execute a particular course of action. In other words, it’s
something you can no longer do. It is the cost of selecting that course of action. For
instance, if I decide I’m going to shoot up 85% of all of my artillery ammunition tonight,
then tomorrow morning one of the opportunity costs of that decision is an inability to
provide artillery fires until I can get re-supplied. That’s an opportunity cost.
It’s not a risk. Risk is the likelihood that something will happen times the consequences if
it does happen. Using the artillery y example, if we are engaged in a United Nations
support operation, firing up all the artillery rounds may have very little consequence, and
hence the risk is slight. However, if we were engaged in North Korea, it would be an
entirely different and far more serious risk situation. So, a good decision support tool at
the Joint Task Force level should help us identify opportunity costs and certainly should
assist in assessing the associated risk. Philosophically, I would never build a system that
assesses risk. I would build one that provides indices and allows professionals to assume
that responsibility. I continue to believe that the responsibility for risk assessment must
remain squarely on the shoulders of the commander and his staff.
The graphic below presents the basic logic flow of Seaway. Many of you are thinking, “
I’ve seen that before.” and you bet you have. It’s the logic of the military planning
process. First, A commander generates a notion. Then, using IPB and LPB tools in
SEAWAY we can quickly generate a scheme of maneuver on an interactive battlefield.
Interactive? What does that mean? It means that as I draw the rivers in, the agents
understand that they are rivers. If I try to draw a scheme of maneuver across that river for
a tank unit they will alert. They will look at that unit and tell me “Sorry, tanks don’t swim.
You need to find a bridge or go somewhere else.” In other words, they understand what’s
on that map. They understand what’s in the unit. They understand the terrain and the
weather. If we create a swamp and we try to go through it, they’re going to adjust the rate
of advance and all kinds of other things in the logistics.
So, returning to the logic flow, we generate a scheme of maneuver. First we task organize
the force to be employed. SEAWAY can employ units as task forces, as individual units,
or as combinations of task forces and units. It is adaptive because we have to be adaptive
as we fight. It is doctrinally neutral, allowing the user to employ the force according to any
doctrine that is appropriate. Just as we can create allied and friendly task forces,
SEAWAY supports creating enemy task forces and then employing these. Although this
capability has not been tested, everything that we’re going to discuss today concerning
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friendly forces can be accomplished with enemy forces, neutral forces, and allied forces.
You can task organize all four, you can employ all four, and you can assess supportability,
opportunity costs, and risks for all. Now, at this point I don’t know where this capability is
going to lead because we really haven’t been able to test it yet. However, there’s some real
excitement about it building in the intelligence community about it.
Once we have generated a scheme of maneuver on SEAWAY’s interactive battlefield, we
can pose key questions aimed at assessing supportability, opportunity costs, and risk.
Question one: is it supportable in terms of inventory? Question two: can I deliver it to with
the transport assets I have? And, question three? At what price (in both cases)? The
question of price focuses on opportunity costs and risks. For example, the “price” of
delivery can be measured in lost operational flexibility for the joint task force. Because
we’re operating at a deep inland location, all logistics must be delivered by helicopter.
However, maneuver also depends on helicopters – the same helicopters. That’s the built in
tension in emerging doctrine, especially that supporting sea basing. A tool such as
SEAWAY must assist in rapidly furnishing decision support to commanders and staffs in
answering the question of “At what price?”
A good operational planning team at I MEF can generate a scheme of maneuver in
SEAWAY in about 10 or 15 minutes for a MEB of 12-15,000 troops. Once that scheme is
complete, the OPT will give SEAWAY guidance on expected intensity, phases in the
scheme, and other key guidance. SEAWAY will then rapidly perform several functions.
First, agents will translate the operational scheme of maneuver into a logistic statement of
requirements in about ten minutes. That statement is a recommendation of what must be
delivered in what quantity to what landing zones for which units in what time frame in
order to support the phased scheme of maneuver generated by the OPT.
Next, we arrive at our first major decision point. Do we have the fuel, water, food, and
ammunition inventory to do it? Because SEAWAY is fully interoperable with ICODES
(and hopefully with TCAIMSII when that system is proved), agents can compare what is
required to execute the scheme of maneuver phase-by-phase with what is currently
available and what is en route to the theater. The result is to identify the deficits, where
stocks are located that could offset them, and when new stocks of the short items are die to
arrive. So, as a Joint Task Force commander, at any point in time, I can see what is coming
and what is here, and how well it supports my proposed course of action. Now, with
agents translating operational courses of action directly into logistic requirements and
comparing these with available supplies, we have given the JFC a valuable tool with which
to shape the theater out perhaps thirty days.
In this process we would probably receive alerts with messages such as the fact that we
don’t have enough 155 to execute at the intensities we have specified. Well maybe we do
and maybe we don’t. You and I may know very well that we do, and that the deficit is in
fact very minor. However, the agents are making recommendations based on a set of rules.
Recommendations – not decisions.
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Let me talk for a moment about decision support systems and the importance of
transparency. My advice is simple: If you can’t open the hood and look at the basis for
every computation and how the agents are functioning, don’t buy it and don’t use it. It’s
that simple. I think the rule is ironclad. Don’t buy it and don’t use it if you can’t open it
up and can’t look at it. Every computational basis in Seaway is transparent to the user.
That’s the good news. The bad news is you’d better protect access to these important
files.
Once the commander has determined that the scheme of maneuver is supportable in terms
of inventory, the question becomes “Can I get it there, and at what price in terms of
operational flexibility?” First, we identify the assets which are available to deliver supplies
and equipment. There are tools which support reserving helicopters and other delivery craft
down for maintenance, to be used in assaults and other tactical operations, and various
other categories used by the operating forces. SEAWAY will then load every remaining
helicopter (and LCAC if these can be employed) individually by tail number, using the
performance characteristics for that particular craft. The agents in SEAWAY will then
create a detailed sortie-level phased delivery plan that exactly corresponds to the demands
and the timing of the parent scheme of maneuver.
Why go to such lengths? Because SEAWAY was designed for war fighting assessment and
this sort of accuracy and realism is way beyond “tonnage divided by numbers of aircraft”.
If I have 12 helicopters on the deck of a LHA how many of them do you think will have
the same characteristics? Perhaps three? The other nine will have all different lift
characteristics, and these might vary by as much as 40%. It gets better than that. What’s
the difference between a helicopter lifting off and LHD seaward of Wonsan in February
and lifting off and LHD seaward of Wonsan in July? It may be as much as a 40% variation
in payload. Heat and humidity take their toll on helicopters. So, to summarize this step,
Seaway allows you to characterize and to set performance characteristics for every
helicopter individually as you build the delivery plan. Agents then load each bird
individually and build a sortie level plan involving multiple ships, multiple tactical bases
ashore, and multiple forward landing zones. It is complex, and it ought to be for that is the
nature of warfighting.
SEAWAY may take as long as twenty or twenty five minutes to generate all of the sorties
and decision aids describing a delivery plan of 100 sorties or more.. We may also receive
agent alerts indicating that the supplies and equipment needed for the scheme of maneuver
can’t be delivered in the time element which we have prescribed. In this case the agents
offer us several different options designed to bring the plan into an acceptable state. We
can move the sea base; we can level supplies between landing zones; we can increase
transportation assets; and, if we still can’t deliver the needed supplies in the timeframe
required, then the course of action is unsupportable in terms of delivery. But, for the first
time, because SEAWAY is distributed and collaborative, we all know it’s not supportable,
whether the JFC at sea, the GCE commander ashore, or the J3 over there on the top of a
mountain. And, we can all see why it's unsupportable without staff meetings and endless
briefings. We can all see the same explanatory screen at the same time.
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What does this do to tempo? It can dramatically speed it up. What does it do to adaptation
if I can now do three or four schemes of maneuver in a morning that previously took three
days? What does it do to accuracy if we’ve got agents tracking hundreds of thousands of
items and rapidly calculating the support for each phase in a scheme of maneuver? N75
used Seaway two weeks ago in an analysis of future LHA-R requirements. Some of the
MEB delivery plans were 180 sorties long and involved several hundred thousand items
for delivery.
Now. Let me pause for a minute and address how SEAWAY creates and then employs
ships to build a sea base. Because ICODES is fully interoperable, agents in SEAWAY can
digitally create any US ship including all service pre-positioning vessels, all L-class ships,
and all black bottoms owned or leased by TRANSCOM. Additionally, for the almost 300
ships in the current system inventory, SEAWAY knows the deck cyclic rates. It knows the
helicopter spots. It knows the L-CAC wells, and it knows many other characteristics, all of
which may be adjusted by the user. You can increase the helicopter spots. You can
increase the wet wells if you want to do all that. But the defaults are the clear values of the
ships as these exist today.
SEAWAY is not designed as a current battle management tool. We’re building a planning
and assessment tool. So don’t mix up battle management or war-gaming a current battle
situation with planning and assessment. Battle management is “right now”, and is
essentially reactive. SEAWAY is really a set of tools designed to support the staff in
performing future operations and future plans – operations to be conducted two to 30 days
out. It’s tools could also be used to validate and assess the extent to which an existing
theater war plan could actually support a prescribed force under a specified set of
operational conditions using the logistics which have been planned. There are undoubtedly
many many more uses,
A question always arises on how the agents calculate the logistics for each phase in a
proposed scheme of maneuver. What do the agents know as that is occurring? They know
the distances and the forms of maneuver which have been prescribed (some are more
consumptive than others). They know every vehicle in a unit or task force and what it
consumes. They know every vehicle in a unit or task force that shoots, and what it shoots
at each specified intensity. And because we gave it guidance on the scheme of maneuver,
they know the expected intensities. The agents are observing and calculating constantly as
we task organize, select objectives and forms of maneuver, receive weather conditions and
their impacts, and provide commander's guidance. Logistics is now part of the course of
action generation process rather than an inaccurate and much delayed postscript.
There are many capabilities that have been asked for in the next SEAWAY, Version 3.0. It
will include the capability to generate all supporting plans for the STOM assault and a
great many other things, including support not just to rotary wing aviation but also to fixed
wing aviation. Other things that have been asked for that are well within the scope of this
kind of technology is clicking on a river to get its flow and its width, or getting a building’s
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composition or many other significant intelligence –related advances. All of that can be
added.
In summary, as an example of advanced adaptive decision support, SEAWAY is “different
strokes for different folks”. Adaptive decision support systems should be useful tools. For
the acquisition community, Seaway is being used to model future ship capabilities. The
Marine Corps is looking at it from the standpoint of how to support operational maneuver
from a sea base, and what kinds of formations are supportable under what kinds of
condition, doing what sort of combat. The operational planning teams have used it on the
West Coast to generate schemes of maneuver and to quickly assess their supportability.
The combat developers at are exploring the new concepts by building schemes of
maneuver under different kinds of weather and different kinds of terrain to see what they
result in, and introducing new equipment, new trucks. Or, for example, a 22% reduction in
fuel consumption – what does that do to free helicopters from logistics delivery missions
for assault support? The impact could be enormous; a less consumptive force could have a
significant impact on the helicopter requirements to support it. SEAWAY can help us get
these answers and many, many more.
I thank you for your attention. Thank you very much.
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